Which of the following is NOT part of an argument for eliminative materialism? a. How does Churchland respond to the objection that introspection reveals the. Eliminative Materialism. Paul Churchland. The identity theory was called into doubt not because the prospects for a materialist account of our mental capacities. Paul M. Churchland; Published Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at.

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Mirror Sites View this site from another server: For example, hard determinists like Holbach are eliminativists with regard to free will because they claim there is no dimension of human psychology that corresponds to our commonsense notion of freedom. But there is no clear consensus on how much of a mismatch materialsim necessary before we can say a given posit doesn’t exist.

Furthermore, they argue, folk psychology’s development in the last 2, years has not been significant and it is therefore a stagnating theory. The standard argument for eliminative materialism begins with the Sellarsian thesis that we employ a theoretical framework to explain and predict intelligent behavior.

This paper has highly influenced 23 other papers. Weak ontic commitments involve the types-of-things countenanced by some theory. Like dualists, eliminative materialists insist that ordinary mental states can not in any way be reduced to or identified with neurological events or processes.

Nonreductive Materialism in Philosophy of Mind. Rather, light was eventually identified with a form of electro-magnetic radiation.

Eliminative materialism

Nevertheless, contemporary eliminative materialism—the sort of eliminativism that denies the existence of specific types of mental states—is a relatively new theory with a very short history. According to this view, our talk about mental states should be interpreted as talk about abstracta that, although real, are not candidates for straightforward reduction or elimination as the result of cognitive science research. They assert that, for instance, the existence of pain is simply beyond denial.

Since qualia are generally regarded as characteristics of mental states, their existence does not seem to be compatible with eliminativism. Stich offers a variety of reasons for thinking that there are fundamental difficulties that will plague any attempt to provide principled criteria for distinguishing cases of reference success from cases of reference failure.


Eliminativists argue that, based on these and other criteria, commonsense “folk” psychology has failed and will eventually need to be replaced with explanations derived from the neurosciences. If I were to debate Shoemaker we would never get beyond the title.

Eliminative Behavior adenotonsillectomy Irreducibility Neuroscience discipline explanation Theory Attitude Causal filter distilled alcoholic beverage. He attempts to show that there is no materialisj fact of the matter concerning the phenomenon of apparent motion because it is impossible to decide between two competing explanations.

One possible model for this way of thinking about eliminativism might be the discontinuance of talk about germs in favor of more precise scientific terminology of infectious agents. Token Identity in Metaphysics. I argue that when understood within chhrchland wider context of his views of the late matwrialism and early s, Hobbes’s Objections are coherent and reflect his goal of providing an epistemology consistent with a mechanical philosophy.

To support i and ii Stich relies on two premises: Theories of Reference, Misc in Philosophy of Language.

Eliminative materialism – Wikipedia

Psychophysical Reduction, Misc in Philosophy of Mind. New York, Oxford University Press. Kwame Anthony Appiah, “Racisms”. Paul Feyerabend in 20th Century Philosophy. They note, however, that common-sense psychology appears to be stagnant, and there is a broad range of mental phenomena that folk psychology does not allow us to explain.

Modern versions of eliminative materialism claim that our common-sense understanding of psychological states and processes is deeply mistaken and that some or all of our ordinary notions of mental states will have no home, at any level of analysis, in a sophisticated and accurate account of the mind.

This criticism comes from two very distinct traditions. Mental States and Processes in Philosophy of Mind. However, in assuming biology reveals everything about human experience, eliminative materialists are faced with a presupposed dualism: Moreover, since it was difficult to see how the second version was significantly different from various forms of reductive materialism hence, Quine’s skepticism about the difference between elimination and explication it also raised doubts about the distinctiveness of eliminative materialism.


Topics Discussed in This Paper. It has also been argued against folk psychology that the intentionality of mental states like belief imply that they have semantic qualities. While Sellars himself regarded this theoretical framework as empirically correct, his claim that our conception of the mind is theory-based, and at least in principle falsifiable, would be influential to later supporters of eliminativism.

Consequently, the transition from demonology to modern accounts of this behavior was ontologically radical. If Ramsey, Stich and Garon are right, certain connectionist models may, for the first time, provide us with a plausible account of cognition that supports the denial of belief-like states. Rather, it is that the eliminativist herself is doing something that disconfirms her own thesis.

Where much contemporary philosophy seeks to stave off cchurchland “threat” of nihilism by safeguarding the experience of meaning–characterized as the defining feature churchlajd human existence–from the Enlightenment logic of disenchantment, this book attempts to push nihilism to its ultimate conclusion by forging a link between revisionary naturalism in Anglo-American philosophy and anti-phenomenological realism in recent French philosophy.

Descartes famously challenged much of what we take for granted, but he insisted that, for the most part, we can be confident about the content of our own minds. Eliminative materialists claim that this is precisely what will happen with at least some of our folk mental notions.

In a nutshell, Stich argues that i the thesis of eliminative materialism, according to which propositional attitudes don’t exist, is neither true nor false, and that ii even if it were true, that would be philosophically uninteresting.